RAND Analysts: Chinese Military’s View of Starlink as a Weapon Shapes Its Own LEO Strategy

Insider Brief

• A RAND study finds that China’s military views Starlink and other U.S. low Earth orbit constellations as major threats, prompting the rapid development of a Chinese megaconstellation called Project SatNet.
• The People’s Liberation Army sees Starlink as a model for resilient battlefield communications and believes it could support missile defense and offensive operations despite limited public evidence.
• RAND analysts warn that Chinese perceptions of U.S. space dominance are deeply entrenched, making escalation dynamics in space more volatile as China builds countermeasures and expands its own satellite network.

Space is fast becoming a contested military frontier as China races to match and counter U.S. satellite networks in low Earth orbit (LEO).

According to a new RAND report, PLA strategists now view LEO constellations — especially SpaceX’s Starlink — as integral to U.S. warfighting doctrine, and that is influencing Beijing’s mobilization of its own megaconstellation, dubbed Project SatNet, as both strategic parity and a direct countermeasure ​.

PLA Sees Starlink as Strategic Threat

The study, written by by Howard Wang, Jackson Smith and Cristina L. Garafola, finds that PLA observers assume U.S. policy, military doctrine and private-sector launches are tightly coordinated steps toward space dominance. PLA analysts equate Starlink with resilient, proliferated LEO (pLEO) architectures. This strategy relies on the scattering hundreds or thousands of small satellites to ensure network survivability under attack. China regards these constellations as proof of U.S. “hostile intent” to integrate space into joint combat operations, the analysts report. This perspective hardened after Starlink’s real-world utility in Ukraine in early 2022, crystallizing LEO’s perceived military value.

“PLA scholars appear to assess that the United States’ pursuit of military dominance in space reached an inflection point between 2018 and 2022, exhibited by new doctrine and highly threatening new capabilities in LEO, such as Starlink,” the team writes.

PLA threat assessments extend far beyond internet service. Analysts contend that Starlink’s vast network could enable rapid battlefield data processing, resilient communications for aircraft and precision navigation, and even act as an anti-ballistic-missile layer or co-orbital interceptor — functions that exceed publicly acknowledged Starlink capabilities . Such estimates rest on assumptions that Starlink satellites carry electronic-warfare payloads or maneuverable debris shields capable of intercepting missiles, despite little open evidence for such features.

Mapping the Data

To illuminate how senior PLA thinkers and technical experts collectively interpret evolving U.S. space policies and prototype systems, the RAND team surveyed more than 120 open-source Chinese sources, supplemented by state media and industry writings​. (More on the researchers’ methods below.)

Their analysis identifies three core drivers shaping PLA threat perceptions of Starlink:

1. Hostile Intent, rooted in a long-standing PLA view that U.S. space activity pursues unchallenged dominance.
2. Disruption of PLA Operations, as pLEO constellations undercut China’s preferred strategy of neutralizing key orbital nodes.
3. Strategic Instability, given fears that space-based networks could erode China’s nuclear deterrent or conventional balances.

Smaller influences include concerns that Starlink’s commercial internet could evade Chinese information controls and that U.S. satellite suppliers might capture market share in emerging space economies.

Rising China’s SatNet Ambition

In direct response, China has elevated development of its own LEO megaconstellation — dubbed Project SatNet — to national strategic priority status. Established under state-owned China SatNet Co. in 2021, the program is charged with fielding thousands of satellites by the mid-2020s to ensure broadband internet access and military resilience ​. Officials and party cadres have framed SatNet as essential for self-reliance, likening its importance to China’s Beidou navigation system.

More than that, according to the report, China’s efforts to build a megaconstellation are a countermeasure to Starlink.

They write: “The most significant Chinese countermeasure to Starlink appears to be making the development of a corresponding Chinese LEO megaconstellation called Project SatNet a national priority. In addition to acquiring a countermeasure to Starlink, China’s development of Project SatNet is likely motivated by the fear of falling significantly behind U.S. capabilities in space. This dynamic is not unique to Starlink and can be. observed in China’s response to other U.S. capabilities in LEO, such as the spaceplane X-37B.”

Project SatNet’s scope and pace reflect Beijing’s urgency: multiple experimental satellites have already launched, and partnerships with major state firms and PLA-affiliated contractors signal military requirements for command, control and sensing missions. Despite early technical hurdles — such as achieving cost-effective manufacturing and launch comparable to U.S. levels — the state backing and integration with commercial space firms point to accelerated development timelines.

Soft-Kill and Space–Fence Countermeasures

PLA researchers have also proposed an explicit five-part counter-Starlink plan, stressing both technical and informational measures:

• Erect a Chinese “Space Fence” radar network to track the hundreds of Starlink satellites in LEO.
• Catalog Starlink deployments by launch batch to simplify monitoring.
• Demand SpaceX provide precise orbital data for early warning of close approaches.
• Develop “soft-kill” capabilities — ground-based lasers, high-power microwaves or cyber tools — to disable reconnaissance payloads or jam communications.
• Deploy a comparable large-scale Chinese constellation to occupy orbital slots, monitor Starlink and contest its operations ​.

These proposals show that the PLA struggles to target a diffuse constellation with traditional direct-ascent antisatellite weapons. By emphasizing soft-kill tools and mirror constellations, the PLA seeks workarounds to suppress Starlink without triggering full kinetic exchanges.

Disinformation at the UN

Beyond technical plans, Beijing has waged a diplomatic and media campaign to portray Starlink as destabilizing, according to the RAND analysts. Chinese delegates to United Nations space safety meetings have alleged — without evidence — that Starlink satellites endanger China’s Tiangong space station and block developing nations from LEO orbital tracks. State media have repeatedly called for new international rules on “space traffic management” to constrain proliferated constellations ​.

These information efforts feed domestic narratives of U.S. technological aggression and bolster calls for Chinese regulatory responses, despite U.S. offers to share collision-avoidance data. The study highlights this propaganda push as a nonkinetic front in the space competition. A nonkinetic front refers to areas of conflict where nations compete or fight through cyberattacks, electronic warfare, space operations, or information campaigns, without using direct physical force.

Crisis Dynamics in Space

The RAND report cautions that PLA counterspace operations against a resilient U.S. constellation may be seen as less escalatory, raising the risk of provocative acts in orbit. On the other hand, U.S. strikes on Chinese satellites before SatNet is fully operational could be viewed by Beijing as highly escalatory​.

The analysts recommend that U.S. planners avoid costly efforts to mollify Chinese perceptions — since PLA views of U.S. hegemonic intent are deeply entrenched — and instead prepare for an environment where Beijing believes it can act more boldly in space with limited escalation risk. Policies for rapid attribution, allied communications and hardened commercial partnerships will be vital to deter miscalculations.

The team writes: “DoD and the USSF should anticipate and be prepared to counter disinformation campaigns directed toward both government and commercial U.S. assets. The CCP and PLA make little, if any, distinction between public and private assets in space and consider the commercially owned Starlink to be a tool of U.S. military power.”

Study Methods, Scope and Limits

The analysts based their research primarily on authoritative Chinese Communist Party (CCP) media and official People’s Liberation Army (PLA) documents, especially materials from the PLA’s professional military education (PME) curriculum. When official sources were unavailable, they prioritized research from Chinese scholars and practitioners affiliated with key institutions shaping PLA doctrine, such as the Academy of Military Science (AMS), the National Defense University (NDU), and the Aerospace Engineering University. They also included insights from PLA personnel in space-related positions.

To supplement this, the analysts reviewed less-authoritative materials from Chinese defense contractors, like the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), which provide information on relevant technologies and industrial capabilities. In total, they examined about 120 journal articles and 10 PME textbooks, focusing on terms like low Earth orbit (LEO), small and micro satellites, Starlink, and resilient space. This methodology aimed to capture the perspectives of China’s senior leadership while maintaining broad technical coverage.

By design, the analysis relies exclusively on open Chinese sources and does not incorporate PLA internal communications or classified data. This limitation leaves open questions on the true technical maturity of proposed countermeasures and Project SatNet’s operational readiness. Moreover, developments since September 2024—such as new PLA doctrine or satellite tests—may outpace the report’s findings.

Looking Ahead

Future work should track Project SatNet’s first operational launches and any dual-use payload demonstrations. Observers ought to monitor Russian attempts at jamming Starlink in Ukraine, as PLA authors have cited those incidents as validation of soft-kill approaches. Additionally, the pace of U.S. pLEO expansion — including military Starshield payloads — will shape Beijing’s threat calculus and inform the next round of counterspace planning.

For a deeper dive into the topic and recommendations, please read the RAND report.